Hollow cathode plasma penetration study Final report

Hollow cathode electron beam discharge for penetrating plasma sheath around reentry vehicl

Symposium Foreword: Bombshell or Baby Step? The Ramifications of Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy

This short essay, which serves as the Symposium Foreword, argues that the rationale of Miller is incoherent insofar as it permits juvenile LWOP sentences and that the Court misidentifies the foundational principle of Roper. First, in banning mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences, the Court invokes Woodson, which bans mandatory death sentences. The Court maintains that Woodson, from its capital jurisprudence, applies because juvenile LWOP is “akin to the death penalty” for juveniles. But if the Court’s capital jurisprudence is binding based on that equivalence, Roper should imply that juvenile LWOP, like the death penalty, is unconstitutional for juveniles. This essay briefly explores whether there is a principled reason for the Court to invoke Woodson but not Roper from its capital jurisprudence. Second, the Court does cite Roper for its “foundational principle,” which is, according to the Court, “that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” However, this principle cannot be the bedrock of Roper. Since Lockett, state capital sentencing schemes have not proceeded as though juvenile offenders were not children. Juvenile capital defendants could introduce their youth and accompanying characteristics in mitigation. Roper, therefore, is based on a much stronger principle, one that requires categorical removal of juveniles from the universe of death-eligible defendants and, thus, should imply the same for penalties equivalent to death. This Foreword also provides a guide to the symposium’s wonderful contributions by Nancy Gertner, Will Berry, Frank Bowman, Josh Gupta-Kagan, Michael O’Hear, Clark Peters, Mary Price, and Mae Quinn. In doing so, it highlights a fascinating theme running through many authors’ answer to whether Miller represents a “bombshell or babystep”: Miller’s implications for the Court’s methodology for conducting proportionality analyses and, specifically, for the role of “objective indicia” of public attitudes in such analyses

Symposium: Bombshell or Babystep - The Ramifications of Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy: Symposium Foreword

Part II of this Foreword briefly addresses one open constitutional question in the wake of Miller: in light of its rationale, is juvenile LWOP – whether mandatory or the result of an individualized sentencing process – constitutionally permissible? I argue that the Miller opinion itself is incoherent insofar as it permits juvenile LWOP as a constitutionally viable sentence. Part III provides a short synopsis of the controversy among Justices regarding the proper methodology for Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses. Then, with particular attention to the authors’ different takes on Miller’s implications for methodology, Part III provides a guide to the symposium contributions focusing on the Eighth Amendment. Parts IV and V will then briefly summarize our symposium contributions focusing on sentencing policy more generally and on Missouri’s juvenile justice system

Physician Participation in Executions, the Morality of Capital Punishment, and the Practical Implications of Their Relationship

Evidence that some executed prisoners suffered excruciating pain has reinvigorated the ethical debate about physician participation in lethal injections. In widely publicized litigation, death row inmates argue that the participation of anesthesiologists in their execution is constitutionally required to minimize the risk of unnecessary suffering. For many years, commentators supported the ethical ban on physician participation reflected in codes of professional medical organizations. However, a recent wave of scholarship concurs with inmate advocates, urging the law to require or at least permit physician participation

The \u27Abuse Excuse\u27 in Capital Sentencing Trials: Is it Relevant to Responsibility, Punishment, or Neither?

The violent criminal who was a victim of severe childhood abuse frequently appears in the responsibility literature because he presents a difficulty for theorists who maintain the compatibility of causal determinism and our practices of holding persons responsible. The challenge is based on the fact that learning about an offender\u27s horrific childhood mitigates the indignation that many persons feel towards him, possibly indicating that they hold him less than fully responsible. Many capital defendants present evidence of suffering childhood abuse, and many jurors find this evidence to count against imposing death. The most obvious explanation for a response like this is that the abuse was a cause of the crime, and so rendered the offender less than fully responsible for it. But this intuitive explanation theatens the claim that responsibility is compatible with causation. Indeed, if causation is a basis for excuse (even a partial one), the fairness of holding persons responsible is threatened given that all our behavior is caused by factors, such as our upbringing, outside our control. A common compatibilist response to this challenge is that abuse is relevant to responsibility if the abuse caused a diminished capacity for practical reasoning. This response, however, cannot account for all cases in which abuse evidence appears relevant to the punishment determination, and thus I confront the challenge more directly. I argue that there are cases in which it is appropriate for jurors to consider abuse evidence independently of whether the capital defendant\u27s reasoning capacities were diminished and offer an account to justify the consideration of that evidence as mitigating, even when we should resist concluding that the offender was less than fully responsible. My argument rests on distinguishing the capacities required for responsibility from other considerations that militate against punishment and which help justify the criminal law. A minimally decent moral education, which some forms of abuse preclude, is one of those considerations that helps justify the criminal law\u27s harsh penalties. I argue that it is more difficult to justify the death penalty for a defendant who was deprived of a minimally decent moral education compared with others who were not, regardless of whether that defendant\u27s reasoning capacities were sufficient for full responsibility

Speed of Small Droplets on Repellent Surfaces

A droplet of fluid can slide or roll down an angled surface if the droplet doesn’t stick to the plate (e.g., droplets on glass). The most common surface to allow for such this motion are hydrophobic surfaces. One example is a freshly waxed car where the rain beads up and rolls off. Another example is if a pan is heated to a high enough temperature then when small amounts of water are added the droplet will skitter around on the surface for a moment before boiling away. This high temperature effect where droplets rest on a vapor layer underneath cause by the heat is called the Leidenfrost point. One might ask which surface type will encourage a droplet to go down the surface fastest? Herein an analysis and comparison of droplets on both of these types of surfaces is performed, with consideration given to the size of the droplet, the angle of the surface, and the type of droplet by varying the relative thickness or viscosity. The droplet velocity and acceleration are compared and the hydrophobic surfaces with water have the most consistent high velocities. However, making the droplets more viscous slows down the droplets on hydrophobic surface more effectively than on Leidenfrost ones. Finally, both surfaces can produce a form of thrust if conditions are right

Symposium: Bombshell or Babystep - The Ramifications of Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy: Symposium Foreword

Part II of this Foreword briefly addresses one open constitutional question in the wake of Miller: in light of its rationale, is juvenile LWOP – whether mandatory or the result of an individualized sentencing process – constitutionally permissible? I argue that the Miller opinion itself is incoherent insofar as it permits juvenile LWOP as a constitutionally viable sentence. Part III provides a short synopsis of the controversy among Justices regarding the proper methodology for Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses. Then, with particular attention to the authors’ different takes on Miller’s implications for methodology, Part III provides a guide to the symposium contributions focusing on the Eighth Amendment. Parts IV and V will then briefly summarize our symposium contributions focusing on sentencing policy more generally and on Missouri’s juvenile justice system

Non-Beneficial Pediatric Research and the Best Interest Standard: A Reconciliation

Federal efforts beginning in the 1990\u27s have successfully increased pediatric research to improve medical care for all children. Since 1997, the FDA has requested 800 pediatric studies involving 45,000 children. Much of this research is non-beneficial ; that is, it exposes pediatric subjects to risk even though these children will not benefit from participating in the research. Non-beneficial pediatric research (NBPR) seems, by definition, contrary to the best interests of pediatric subjects, which is why one state supreme court has essentially prohibited it. It also appears that the only plausible rationale for this research is utilitarian, as it risks some children for the good of all. But that rationale is troubling. This article answers two related questions: (1) What is the appropriate legal relationship between NBPR and the best interests of the child standard? (2) What is the ethical justification for this research? I argue that courts should hold that the best interests standard governs pediatric research. But, contrary to existing case law, courts must consider the benefits to each child, including pediatric subjects, from a policy that permits NBPR, and not simply consider that a non-beneficial protocol presents more risk than potential benefit to a child. Moreover, I argue that the justification for the practice need not be utilitarian. There is no need to appeal to the greater good to justify the research because each child has reason to endorse a policy permitting NBPR where there is a very low ceiling on acceptable risk, and each child has reason to participate in a practice from which she benefits. More controversially, I argue that each child, like other persons, has reason to help others when she can do so at little to no cost to herself. The article then highlights practical implications of the offered justifications